The unique capacity of the self to reflect upon itself, named self-awareness, has Abstract -Little is known with regard to the precise cognitive tools the self uses in acquiring and processing information about itself. In this article, we underline the possibility that inner speech might just represent one such cognitive process. Duval and Wicklund's theory of self-awareness and the selfconsciousness, and self-knowledge body of work that was inspired by it are reviewed, and the suggestion is put forward that inner speech parallels the state of self-awareness, is more frequently used among highly self-conscious persons, and represents an effective, if not indispensable, tool involved in the formation of the self-concept. The possibility is also raised that the extent to which one uses inner speech could partially explain individual differences in self-consciousness and self-knowledge. A selective review of the private and inner speech literature is presented, and some possible ways of testing the hypothesis by using pre-existing techniques are proposed in the hope of stimulating empirical investigations. Some implications are outlined in conclusion.
always puzzled philosophers and psychologists alike. Just how, through what cognitive processes, do we have access to the content of our current subjective experiences?
What goes on at a cognitive level when we try to understand ourselves? In other words, how does the self acquire information about itself, and form a coherent picture of what it is, by organizing this information into a self-concept? These are undoubtedly among the most intriguing questions in psychology.
The study of self-awareness was traditionally confined to phenomenological approaches until operationalizations of this concept were developed (Rime & LeBon, 1984) . Duval and Wicklund's proposition (1972) that a state of selfawareness could be induced and thus manipulated using devices like mirrors and cameras, set the departure point to a new and important research strategy; selfrecognition in the mirror has been repeatedly used to map the existence of a selfconcept in primates and children (see Gallup & Suarez, 1986) ; a scale measuring the disposition to focus inward (self-consciousness) has been developed by Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss (1975) ; and numerous self-description forms have helped us to gather information on the knowledge people have of themselves A. Morin and J. Everett (see l'Ecuyer, 1978) , and how it is organized in memory (see Kihlstrom, Cantor, Albright, Chew, Klein, & Niedenthal, 1988) . These operationalizations of self-awareness, self-consciousness, and selfknowledge have enabled us to learn a lot about the effects and consequences of self-directed attention, the ontogenesis of the self-concept, and the content and organization of self-information. Still, little is known with regard to the precise cognitive tools the self uses in processing information about itself. In this paper, it will be suggested that inner speech is arguably one of the most important cognitive processes involved in the acquisition of information about the selfthat a reasonable, if not obvious, answer to the question "How does the self acquire information about itself and form a coherent picture of what it is" is by talking to itself about itself.
Although the cogency of this hypothesis is self-evident, it has never received proper attention; moreover, it has never been tested empirically.
In what follows, an attempt will be made to show that the idea of inner speech serving a mediational function in self-awareness, self-consciousness, and self-knowledge, is highly consistent with some of the most influential work in these respective areas, and that the extent to which one uses inner speech f-or introspection could also partially explain individual differences in self-consciousness and selfknowledge.
Some possible ways of testing the hypothesis by using pre-existing techniques will be proposed in the hope of stimulating empirical investigations, and some philosophical and clinical implications will be outlined in conclusion. Mead's original ideas (1934) , Duval and Wicklund (1972; see also Wicklund, 1975 see also Wicklund, , 1978 Wicklund 8c Golwitzer, 1987) postulated that attention could be directed either externally toward the environment or internally toward the self. In this second condition, the individual becomes the object of its own attention, and can consequently observe his or her own characteristics: He or she is in a state ofself-awareness. Attention in this state is likely to focus on any aspect of the self that happens to be most salient at the time.
DUVAL AND WICKLUND'S THEORY OF SELF-AWARENESS Inspired by

Although
Duval and Wicklund's theory is well known, we think a rather detailed review is in order here. The theory assumes that people maintain standards of values for various behaviors or self-dimensions. Consequently, the initial reaction to self-focus should be self-evaluation, where a comparison is made between the actual self-aspect observed and an ideal representation of that same self-aspect.
Since it is postulated that a discrepancy will be detected on almost any current behavior, trait, or attitude being examined, self-criticism (the admission of the discrepancy) will motivate the avoidance of the state of self-awareness because of the negative affect linked to it. If avoidance is impossible, an effort will be made to reduce the intraself discrepancy by either modifying the target self-aspect or by changing the ideal itself. It is clear that positive discrepancies can exist (especially after a success experience), in which case a person will actually seek the state of self-awareness; but such a state of affairs is postulated to be uncommon. to be passionately fond of a particular hobby to the point of investing one's entire energy in it is likely to draw attention consistently away from the self, on the other hand, being chronically inactive might just do the opposite. In addition, if a person's surroundings make it problematic for him or her to discriminate himself or herself from his or her immediate environment, it then becomes difficult for him or her to focus on himself or herself as an object.
This determinant has been called &indi7,iduc~tion.&~&u~& (Wicklund, 1975) . Fenigstein et al. (1975) rightly pointed out that "some people constantly think about themselves, scrutinize their behavior, and mull over their thoughts-to the point of obsessiveness.
At the other extreme are persons whose absence of selfconsciousness is so complete that they have no understanding of either their own motives or of how they appear to others" (p. 522). This consistent tendency of persons to direct attention inward or outward (self-consciousness) has been viewed by RimC and LeBon (1984) as being dependent upon past experiences marked by more or less frequent exposure to self-focusing stimuli. It could also be suggested that the spontaneous motivation to avoid self-inspection, especially among persons having many self-discrepancies, might be a significant factor here.
Needless
to say, Duval and Wicklund's proposition that self-focus could be experimentally manipulated, and the construction of a scale measuring dispositions to be self-attentive (Fenigstein et al., 1975) , stimulated a considerable body of empirical work. The validity of self-focus manipulations has been demonstrated many times (see Carver & Scheier, 1978; Davis & Brock, 1975; Geller 8c Shaver 1976) ; factor analysis on the Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS) revealed the existence of three relatively pure subscales: Pyiuute self-consciousness (the disposition to be aware of the covert and hidden aspects of the self), public self-consciousness (a tendency to be aware of the publicly displayed aspects of the self), and social unxiety (see Carver & Glass, 1976; Turner, Scheier, Carver, & Ickes, 1978, for validation details) . Differences in dispositional self-consciousness have been found to lead to the same behavioral effects caused by manipulations of self-attention in a large amount of researches, thus adding credibility to the self-attention construct overall (Carver 8c Scheier, 1981) .
A. hlOL.ill ;intt J. k:\.eIYrt To propose here a comprehensive review of experimental and correlational works in the self-awareness area would clearly be beyond our goal (reviews can be found in Carver, 1979, and Wicklund, 1975 (Beaman, Klentz, Diener, & Svanum, 1979) , and college students will cheat on an "intelligence test" less (Diener & Wallbau, 1976 ) when in front of a mirror. (For more examples, see Brockner & Wallbau, 1981; Carver, 1975; Carver, Antoni, & Scheier 1985; Gibbons 8c Wicklund, 1976 .) The effects of self-awareness are not limited to self-evaluation (Carver, 1979) . Being attentive to the content of our immediate subjective experience--or to any other salient self-aspect-puts us in the position to perceive these raw, or perceptual data, to use Carver and Scheier's (1981) terminology, more acutely. Take emotions as a case in point: In a state of self-awareness, affects will be perceived more vividly and felt more intensely. For example, subjects highly disposed to private self-consciousness will react more aggressively to anger provocation than subjects low on private self-consciousness (Scheier, 1976) . Male subjects exposed to their reflection in a mirror will reliably make more favorable ratings of slides of nude women, or will evaluate an induced mood as being more intense, than subjects with less self-focus (Scheier & Carver, 1977, Thus, high public self-conscious female subjects rejected by a group will react stronger to the rejection (i.e., will judge the group as less attractive and cooperative, and will be less willing to affiliate with it) than low public selfconscious subjects (experiment 1). In most, if not all these representative experiments, we would'suggest that inner speech was present as a mediator of situational or dispositional self-awareness. But before getting to this precise point, let us expose the main idea that motivates this statement.
INNER SPEECH AS A MEDIATOR OF SELF-AWARENESS AND SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS
It is tempting to see our current conscious awareness not only as being dependent upon, but also as being almost synonymous with our "inner voice." In other words, one might argue that inner speech ti the agent when the self is seen as such. Here, however, it is the self as an object that will be of concern, where inner speech will be taken as a cognitive tool for introspection (in an information processing frame of reference), that is, as a cognitive process involved in the acquisition of self-information. In Duval and Wicklund's terminology (1972) , the state of self-awareness consists essentially in "becoming the object of our own attention;" expressions such as "to examine, evaluate, or focus upon oneself," "to introspect," or "to scrutinize one's behavior,"
can repeatedly be found in the self-awareness literature.* Moreover, if one looks at the items of the Self-Consciousness Scale, propositions like "I'm always trying tofipre myself out," "I reflect about myself a lot," "I'm aware of the way my mind works when I work through a problem," and "I usually worry about making a good impression" will be found. But what do all these expressions really mean? What cognitive operations do they represent? Is to be "self-attentive" a prerequisite activity to the unfolding of numerous internal operations, or is it sufficient for the acquisition of self-information? It is our contention that these expressions often mean in fact "to talk to oneself about oneself," and that the notion of "self-directed attention," as convenient as it may be, nevertheless embodies in all likelihood diverse cognitive processes whose abundance is in fact the measure of our ignorance. In our view, inner speech represents such a cognitive process (imagery might also be another important "self-representational"
process-see Morin & Everett, in press, Morin 8c DeBlois, 1989 , Rollins, 1989 . To be sure, identifying, interpreting, classifying, integrat-*Other typical expressions are: "To think about oneself," to recognize one's attributes," "to be cognizant of an intra-self discrepancy," "to atknd to a self-tratt, " "to rate oneself on a self-dimension,"
"to mull mm one's thoughts, " "tofind shortcomings within the self, " "toludge the correctness of a selfaspect, '* "to self-blame, " "to self-ctilicize," etc.
hloritl 2111~1 ,I. E:\vr~tt
ing, and retrieving self-information must be mediated by something more than one's attention.
Consequently,
we would propose that more often than otherwise, innerspeech pal-u&& the state of self-awareness and is more frequently used for introspection purposes among highly self-conscious persons. The cogency of this hypothesis is self-evident, yet to our knowledge it has never been mentioned before.* Maybe this is so precisely because it is so obvious. Buss (1980) distinguishes between an early "sensory" self and an advanced "cognitive" self. 'I-he sensory self, based on double stimulation, body boundaries, and mirror image self-recognition, is said to be shared by human infants, some primates, and of course adult humans; the advanced self, based on self-esteem, covertness of thoughts and images, and the awareness of other's perspectives, requires more sophisticated cognitions and social awareness that develop later in childhood.
On the basis of the hypothesis put forward here, we would say that inner speech is probably one of the most important cognitive processes needed in the development of the cognitive self. In terms of determinants of individual differences in self-consciousness, it would certainly be risky to suggest here that inner speech in itself could provoke a state of self-awareness (i.e., affect its frequency), for it is ultimately impossible to know if people often talk to themselves about themselves because they are prone to be self-attentive, or if they are often self-attentive because they have a natural propensity to talk to themselves about themselves. But the possibility nevertheless exists that inner speech could at least sustain a state of self-awareness (i.e., affect its longevity) when avoidance is tempting. After all, we probably all had this experience of feeling uncomfortable with ourselves for unknown reasons (or to feel the need to settle one's emotions), and have the urge to "take a walk" and talk to ourselves about our feelings and emotions. It is certainly reasonable to assume that a link can be draw'n between selfconsciousness and self-knowledge (Buss, 1980) : A highly self-conscious person will find himself or herself in a better position to translate and organize much perceptual self-information available to his or her attention at a given moment into concepuul self-information (Carver & Scheier, 1981; see Kihlstrom et al., 198X; and Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1984 ; for a more detailed analysis of the notion of "conceptual" self-information; also see Markus, 1983;  and McGuire 8c
McGuire, 1988, on the content and organization of self-information). 'I'hat is, this kind of person will associate any newly acquired perceptual self-information to other data of the sarne type (gained through repeated self-observations), and will categorize these data into seylsche~~~n!u.s (this term has been introduced bv Markus, 1977 Markus, , 1983 It is not surprising in that perspective that highly self-conscious people will describe themselves in more detail, using more self-descriptive adjectives, than low self-conscious people (Turner, 1976 (Turner, , 1978b ; moreover, private selfconsciousness has been found to be positively related to speed of deciding on the applicability to oneself of undesirable trait labels (Turner, 1978~) . Presumably this is so because persons high in private self-consciousness have thought a lot about what they are like (Carver 8~ Scheier, 1981) . Subjects being chronically attentive to public aspects of themselves will give a faster evaluation of theh physical characteristics when compared with low publicly self-conscious subjects, and will be judged by others as being more attractive, presumably because they are more concerned and careful about the way they present themselves (Turner, Gilliland, 8c Klein, 1981) .
Since being frequently in a state of self-awareness is likely to result in the acquisition of more self-information, highly self-conscious people will know better how and what they really are. Consequently, the validity of personality measures as predictors of actual behavior (self-report validity) will be greater among such subjects (Pryor, Gibbons, Wicklund, Fazio, & Hood, 1977; Scheier, Buss, & Buss, 1978; Turner, 1978a) . Assessments of various aspects of the self, including attitudes, cognitions, and affective and somatic states, usually will be more accurate when made by a respondent whose attention is self-directed. Selfawareness will promote accuracy by focusing the respondent's attention more carefully on those aspects of the self made relevant by the instrument, and by increasing the person's motivation to report accurately on those self-dimensions (Gibbons, 1983) .
Here again, the reasoning used to defend the idea of inner speech serving a mediational function in self-awareness and self-consciousness can be evoked: It appears unlikely that to be "self-attentive" is sufficient for the acquisition of selfinformation-numerous internal operations are probably implicated in the "translation" (i.e., the interpretation, classification, and integration) of perceptual self-data into conceptual self-knowledge stored as self-schematas in memory. Again, our contention is that inner speech represents an effective, if not indispensable, tool involved in the formation of the self-concept. To "encode, store, abstract, or retrieve self-information"-frequent expressions used in the (self-) information processing literature-are arguably equivalents to "to talk to oneself about oneself." In addition, we would propose that conceptual self-knowledge is semantic knowledge acquired through self-verbalizations.
An example might be helpful. Consider all these occasions when we "catch" (i.e., observe) ourselves emitting a given behavior or thinking in a given pattern that is surprising to us. Spontaneously we reflect on these raw data and tend to associate and integrate them with already acquired information about ourselves: "What did I just do? This is not the first time I have done that. It seems that each time I find myself in that kind of situation, I act in this very same fashion. It must be that in this precise sphere of my personality, I am (trait adjective)." Thus is abstracted conceptual self-information from perceptual data. Of course, one could go much further than the example suggests. Frequently in these typical (verbal) self-analyses, links are created between existing self-schematas, and more global inferences are made about one's general personality, attributes, attitudes, values, behavior, and so on. We postulate that inner speech, obviously, is actively used throughout this self-concept formation. Now, it is clear that inner speech is far from representing the unique means of acquiring self-information.
It might be welcome here to distinguish at least two possible sources of self-information:
The social world and the self. Mead (1934) convincingly argued that the social milieu allows the individual gradually to form an idea of what he is like by being confronted by different ways of thinking, feeling, and acting (i.e., by taking others' point of view, a process that renders his or her own characteristics more salient). Cooley (1902) proposed that the primary information we have about ourselves is represented in terms of reflected appraisals we get from other people (where others represent "mirrors" is not a unique source of self-knowledge. It must be an important one, however, for personal dispositions to be self-aware can be correlated with individual differences in self-knowledge (Turner, 1976 (Turner, , 1978b . Moreover, if one sees the development and elaboration of the self-concept as being not only dependent upon the acquisition of self-information, but also as implying an organization of this information into a coherent whole, the role of cognitive processes can be best appreciated. Self-talk, it seems to us, is particularly well suited to performing such an organizational work on self-information coming from the social environment.
Having suggested earlier that individual differences in the use of inner speech for introspection purposes could in part explain personal dispositions to be self-attentive, it is only logical to propose now that personal dispositions to talk to oneself about oneself might be determinant of individual differences in self-knowledge. In more empirical terms, this would mean that people having a rich and elaborated self-concept are people that frequently talk to themselves about themselves.
So far, the expression "to talk to oneself about oneself" has been particularly favored given the postulated function that has been ascribed to this activity in self-observation.
Of course, people talk to themselves about a lot of things and for many different motives-an aspect of the problem we shall review now.
PRIVATE AND INNER SPEECH
Anyone interested in the "private speech" area finds himself or herself confronted with confusing definitional difficulties when reviewing the literature (Zivin, 1979) . As just mentioned, it must be understood from the start that the activity of talking to oneself (in silence: inner speech; out loud: priz~ate speech) serves many functions, and that its study has been influenced by the particular functions ascribed to it by authors in accordance with their personal theoretical assumptions. For example, Piaget (1926 Piaget ( /1923 used "egocentric speech" in his writings, referring by this expression to children's overt self-verbalizations emitted in social situations without any preoccupation with being understood or with trying to adapt their discourse for others. To Piaget, these self-verbalizations were "egocentric" in that they reflected the general incapacity of young children to differentiate their own perspective from that of others. This type of speech did not serve any positive function, but rather, represented a manifestation of children's cognitive immaturity. Consequently, Piaget postulated 'that it would disappear with the development of relativistic thought (self-awareness). Vygotsky (1962/1934 ) also used the expression "egocentric speech," but in a very different way. He agreed with Piaget that children's verbal behavior was unadapted in social situations, but conceived private speech as serving a positive function, that of cognitive self-guidance.
In Vygotsky's perspective, egocentric speech did not really reflect an incapacity to communicate (the child communicates with himself or herself): Rather, it showed the error made by children in talking to themselves out loud (for self-regulatory purposes) in social situations. Seen as such, private speech was postulated by Vygotsky not to disappear with the cognitive and social development of children, but to go underground and persist.
Of course, the problem is much more complex (see Zivin, 1979 , for an extensive discussion on these topics), and has been exposed here only to show that theoreticians, by viewing inner and private speech in many different perspectives, did not study the same phenomenon, nor did they define and name it in the same way. There is no need here to go into details; suffice to say that Piaget's and Vygotsky's ideas prompted many empirical investigations, the self-regulatory function of inner speech receiving most attention in research through the study of overt self-verbalizations of children (see Zivin, 1979 , for a review, or Harris, 1986 for a more recent example). Other studies of private speech have notably investigated spontaneous speech manifestations (Klein, 1964) , the age curve of speech decline (Kohlberg, Yaeger, 8c Hjertholm, 1968; Rubin, 1979) , its function in role-taking abilities (Flavell, Botkin, Fry, Wright, & .Jarvis, 1968) , the ontogenetic origins of verbal self-control (Bern, 1967; Luria, 1959 Luria, , 1961 , and its use in changing behavior and thinking styles (Meichenbaum, 1973 (Meichenbaum, , 1976 (Meichenbaum, , 1977 (Meichenbaum, , 1984 (Meichenbaum, , 1985 . Vygotsky (1962 Vygotsky ( /1934 and Mead (1934) , among others, recognized that inner speech might be of importance to self-awareness.* To our knowledge, however, *Mead proposed that talking to oneself could give rise to a fictional dialogue where verbalization of an objective, and thus different point of view about ourselves could be possible. The child can only see himself or herself from the perspective of another, and he or she can at first only take this perspective on himself or herself by describing his or her activity to the other and so calling out in himself or herself the implicit response of another to his or her description (Kohlberg et al., 1968) . In this perspective, one function of private speech in early childhood would be to make young speakers aware of their own actions and of their own separate existences (Rubin, 1979).
There is a clear difference between Mead's hypothesis and ours: He saw in private speech a means for children to become the object of their own attention by taking other's perspective, whereas we understand it to be a cognitive tool used by adults for self-observation purposes.
the potential function of inner speech as a mediator of self-awareness, selfconsciousness, and self-knowledge has never been subject to empirical exploration, at least for two reasons. First, as noted earlier, the idea in itself is so evident that we suspect it has been taken for granted.
Second 
(during performance) the "think aloud" and "thought sampling" procedures; 
SOME POSSIBLE WAYS TO TEST THE HYPOTHESIS
First, using techniques developed in the private speech paradigm, we would predict a more important incidence of "introspective" self-verbalizations (i.e., Kohlberg et al. 's, 1986, categories) with children placed in front of a mirror (or using any other self-focusing stimuli) compared with controls, provided the subjects' subjective experience is rich enough and that the experimenter knows and/or controls what precise aspect of the subjective experience is salient at the moment of the self-focus manipulation. This means that subjects should be playing with toys or working on a stimulating task in order to elicit private events to which their attention could be drawn. A good example would be to reproduce Scheier et al.'s (1981) experiment with children and snakes, in which microphones were used to assess the subjects' heart beats. Now, it must be acknowledged that a potential problem exists with this approach using children, namely, that a state of self-awareness could not be created in children aged nine years or below (Beaman et al., 1979 Carver's experiment (1977) with nude slides was repeated with subjects aged seven years, this time using pretty or funny pictures. The attempt failed, which means that this particular research avenue might just not be the most promising one. Still, some other experimentations using private speech could be conceived. , 1978) ; (2) measure the incidence of self-talk in members of disindividualizing groups (like the army); (3) select subjects on their tendency to talk to themselves about themselves instead of their score on the SCS, and try to replicate behavioral effects caused by manipulations of self-attention.
The "think aloud" technique could also prove itself useful. As a pretest, subjects could be instructed to verbalize their covert speech out loud in two conditions:
In front of a mirror and in an empty room. Special care should be taken for the instructions so that subjects would not be encouraged to verbalize for the sake of it when in fact they don't have anything to say to themselves.
Moreover, one could diminish the likelihood of having subjects' attention directed to what they think because of the instructions (thus creating a state of self-awareness in both conditions), by pretending the experiment is about, say, the latency between spontaneous self-verbalizations in relation to age and sex (a bogus apparatus would be installed in the experimental room to that effect). In this way, suqjects would not feel observed, knowing that what they are saying to themselves is not recorded or heard; in addition, their self-verbalizations would probably be more spontaneous and private. These would in fact be recorded, and the experimenter would of course have to inform subjects that they had been deceived, and that the unheard content of the tape could be erased if they wish so. 'I'he predictions would be that subjects in a state of self-awareness should produce significantly more introspective self-statements (like "I feel ridiculous being alone and talking to myself aloud in this empty room") on a total number of self-statements (as "how long do I have to stay here?"). Diener, 1980, or Mikulas, 1986 , among nlany others): You camlot change a given behavior in a desired direction if you are oblivious to the way you act and if' you don't even know how you should behave. Indeed, Scheier and Carver (1988; also see Carver, 1979; and Carver 8c Scheier, 198 1, 1982) 
